Rector’s Reflections
Tuesday 8th October 2024
Christians and the Ethics of War
I am going to start by considering some general approaches to the ethics of war, which do not necessarily have anything to do with Christianity as such. Christians may choose to be guided by these general ethical approaches, without reference to particular aspects of the Christian tradition. I will consider the particular contribution of the Christian ethical tradition in later reflections.
To begin with, some people approach ethical issues in terms of absolute moral values which are held to be universally valid. These absolute moral values are then applied to a particular situation without regard to the context, or to the consequences of doing so. It is usually held that these absolute moral values cannot be over-ridden by other considerations. They tell us what is right, and that’s the end of it. This is sometimes called the “Natural Law” approach to ethics: certain moral values are universally valid, being recognised by all societies at all times. Natural Law theories can but do not necessarily involve a belief in God: they can derive their validity by their status as an objective description of moral reality, regardless of any reference to a Divine legislator. They seek to operate as the equivalent of scientific laws such as the Law of Gravity: the law exists whether or not you agree with it, or even know about it. It’s simply there.
What is the result of applying a “Natural Law” approach to the Ethics of War? Well, it depends.
To start with, it is necessary to define the content of Natural Law. If you say that under Natural Law, it is never right to hurt or kill another human being, you will almost certainly take the view that war is necessarily wrong. But how can we sure that Natural Law does indeed contain an absolute prohibition on hurting or killing other human beings? One might equally well argue that Natural Law contains a qualified prohibition on hurting or killing other human beings : in other words, while generally speaking hurting or killing others is contrary to Natural Law, there are exceptions, for example it is acceptable to hurt or even kill another human being if we are acting in self-defence. The difficulties of defining the content of Natural Law raises the question of whether the concept itself has any validity at all. Natural Law has sometimes been described as “nonsense on stilts”.
I should add that there can be some confusion due to an overlap between the concept of Natural Law and the concept of Human Rights. Some Human Rights are typically considered to be part of Natural Law, for example the right to life. But most of the rights and duties compassed within the term “Human Rights” are those set out in a written agreement, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Such “Human Rights” are binding on the parties to the agreement not because the rights are universally valid ( the “Natural Law” approach), but because they have been guaranteed under the agreement which the parties have signed.
Difficulties with the concept of Natural Law go beyond the difficult and perhaps impossible task of defining what is actually meant by “Natural Law” . There is the difficulty of applying Natural Law to the circumstances of a particular situation. Typically, an elaboration of Natural Law will include many different ethical principles. So what happens when these different ethical principles come into conflict with each other? Who decides which ethical principle should come out on top?
There is a final difficulty. Typically, Natural Law theory involves individuals. It is a way of trying to explore and define the rights and responsibilities of individual human beings. Natural Law does not usually extend to the State, or to collections of individuals , such as the Nation. Wars are not primarily between individuals. Wars are fought between groups of people, or between States. Natural Law is all about inherent rights, but on what grounds can we say that a group of people or a State has any inherent rights? They have rights as individuals, but not as a group.
This leads onto a final consideration. Should different rules apply when we consider the behaviours of nations and States? We might agree with something done by the State, which we would not agree with if it were done by a private individual. We might argue that States have their own morality, and we should not confuse the world of Natural Law with the harsh realities of international politics.
People have different views on such matters. What are your thoughts?